In February 2026, the US Supreme Court in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump ruled that IEEPA (International Economic Emergency Powers Act) does not authorize the President to impose unilateral tariffs. Countries that had already signed Agreements on Reciprocal Trade under the pressure of those tariffs now face a question deserving careful legal scrutiny: does the ruling void what they signed? The answer, properly read, is no, and how that conclusion is reached matters enormously.

Malaysia’s recent experience illustrates the risk of interpretive haste. Trade Minister Johari Ghani declared that Malaysia’s USD 240 billion ART, signed by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and President Trump in October 2025, had been rendered “null and void,” by virtue of the US Supreme Court Ruling, making Malaysia one of the first countries to reach such a conclusion publicly. Within a day, Johari backtracked and clarified that Malaysia had received no official notification from Washington of any cancellation. The episode reflects a broader misreading of the ruling that risks placing countries in a legally and diplomatically untenable position.

The ruling is narrower than most commentary suggests. The Court addressed a single constitutional question: whether President Trump possessed statutory authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs in the absence of a declared national emergency. It concluded he did not. The ruling assessed executive conduct between 2024 and 2025 and confined itself entirely to that question. It does not mention, address, or invalidate any bilateral trade agreement. Indonesia’s ART of 19 February 2026 and Malaysia’s of October 2025 are distinct bilateral instruments, legally separate from the IEEPA mechanism the Court has constrained.

The logical distinction is critical: while the backdrop that drove countries to the negotiating table may have been legally defective, that background does not automatically contaminate the instrument produced by that negotiation. A commitment does not become void simply because one party’s original leverage was unlawful, unless the agreement was procured by coercion or use of force in the legally cognizable sense the standard under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – a much considerably higher bar.

Washington’s conduct since the ruling confirms this. On 13 March 2026, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer finalized an ART with Ecuador even after the SCOTUS ruling where the US continues to secure commitments across agriculture, technology, and digital services. Ecuador pressed forward despite the ruling, reflecting a shared understanding that bilateral ARTs and the IEEPA controversy are legally separate instruments. Trump has also invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a 10% global tariff beginning 24 February 2026, expiring 24 July 2026, while simultaneously launching Section 301 investigations into 60 trading partners in preparation for a new round of potentially permanent tariffs. 

This is where the practical opportunity lies. The ruling constrains future IEEPA-based retaliation and provides legitimate ground for countries that concluded their agreements under what is now considered unlawful economic duress to request renegotiation of asymmetric provisions through available diplomatic channels

For Indonesia, this calculus extends beyond tariffs. The ART of 19 February 2026 contains Section 3.2, which requires Indonesia to recognize the US as an adequate data protection jurisdiction under Indonesian law, an obligation untouched by the Supreme Court. In a scenario where Indonesia renegotiates tariff provisions, Section 3.2 and other non-tariff commitments remain binding unless explicitly put on the renegotiation table. The delegation must enter any such process with a holistic view, not one focused narrowly on goods while consequential digital commitments are left to stand by default.

That renegotiation must also be accompanied by domestic preparation. Recent Indonesian Constitutional Court ruling  confirmed under Articles 59 and 60 of UU PDP as the sole body competent to make adequate determinations  remains unestablished. Its implementing regulations remain in draft. The criteria for assessing a foreign country’s adequacy have not been published. A country entering renegotiation with the world’s largest digital economy without a functioning data protection authority does not negotiate from strength.

Malaysia’s reversal incident  reveals that in moments of legal uncertainty, acting precipitously, whether by proclaiming agreements void or accepting the status quo uncritically, surrenders the analytical ground the moment actually affords. Waiting for Washington’s next move before determining a response is the right posture. Indonesia should adopt the same approach and use the time to build the domestic legal infrastructure that any meaningful engagement with Section 3.2 and other Section will require.

The ruling has not voided Indonesia’s or any other country’s commitments. However, it has changed the conditions under which they were made. That is a meaningful, if bounded, development – and thus it should be read accordingly.